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The district court refused to instruct the jury that the government must prove
"the defendant knew that chemical structures of the substances at issue were
substantially similar to the chemical structures of controlled substances in
Schedule I or II."'
In 2007, Stephen McFadden, "a construction worker, began operating a
small business buying overstocked items and reselling them on the internet." 2
After noticing that several businesses in his neighborhood were selling "bath
salts," McFadden researched the "bath salts" by consulting the controlled

*Director of Legal Research, Analysis and Writing, and Associate Professor of Law,
Charleston School of Law, Charleston, SC. I would also like to thank my research assistants Daniel
Ranaldo and Crystal Swinford for their valuable assistance.
1.
United States v. McFadden (McFadden 1), 15 F. Supp. 3d 668, 675 (W.D. Va. 2013)
(emphasis added), affd, 753 F.3d 432, 436 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015).
2.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, United States v. McFadden, 753 F.3d 432 (4th Cir.
2014) (No. 14-378), 2014 WL 4948942 [hereinafter Petition for Cert.].
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substances list maintained on the Drug Enforcement Agency's (DEA) website
and, finding no indication that the "bath salts" were illegal, began selling the
"bath salts." 3 After discovering that two ingredients in some of his products
were subsequently put on the controlled substance list, McFadden flushed those
products down the toilet and ceased selling them.4 As part of a police
investigation in Charlottesville, Virginia, in July 2011, police received "bath
salts" purchased from McFadden, which were subsequently analyzed by the
DEA. 5 On November 14, 2012, McFadden "was charged in a nine-count
superseding indictment returned by a grand jury in the Western District of
Virginia" 6 alleging that McFadden distributed and conspired to distribute "for
human consumption, controlled substance analogues, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1)
and
846."
The
alleged
analogues
were
"3,4methylenedioxymethcathinone (commonly known as 'methylone' or 'MDMC');
3,4-methylenedioxypyrovalerone (commonly known as 'MDPV'); and 4methyl-ethylcathinone (commonly known as '4-MEC')."8

"At the close of evidence, the district court rejected petitioner's request that
the jury be instructed that the Government was 'required to prove that he knew,
had a strong suspicion, or deliberately avoided knowledge that the [substances at
issue] possessed the characteristics of controlled substance analogues." 9 Instead
the only state of mind requirement, regarding the alleged analogue, that was
given to the jury was that McFadden "intended for the mixture or substance to be
consumed by humans." 0 The district court recognized that this interpretation of
the statute was inconsistent with precedent from the Seventh Circuit, but held
that it was "convinced that this [scienter requirement] is not required by the
statute or Fourth Circuit precedent.""
On January 10, 2013, McFadden was found guilty by a jury on all nine
counts.12 McFadden filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal challenging "the
constitutionality of the Analogue Act; the propriety of the court's instructions to
the jury; the admission of certain expert testimony; and the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his convictions."1 3 McFadden's motion was denied' 4 and he
appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, primarily asserting that the

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 7-8.
United States v. McFadden (McFaddenII), 753 F.3d 432, 437 (4th Cir. 2014).
MFadden I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 671.
Id.
Id.
Petition for Cert., supra note 2, at 8-9 (quoting McFaddenII, 753 F.3d at 443).
MFaddenI, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 676.
Id.
Id. at 671.
Id.
Id. at 681.
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Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986 (the
Act), 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(32)(A), 813 ... is unconstitutionally
vague as applied to him, that the district court abused its
discretion in making certain evidentiary rulings at trial, and that
the government failed to prove that the substances McFadden
distributed qualified as controlled substance analogues under
the Act.' 5

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,1 6 denied a
rehearing, and McFadden subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court. 17 In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit also
noted the circuit split and acknowledged that "[i]n contrast to our decision in
Klecker, the Seventh Circuit has imposed a strict knowledge requirement before
a defendant may be convicted of violating the Act," demanding proof that "'the
defendant knew the substance in question was a controlled substance
analogue."" 8
The United States Supreme Court granted McFadden certiorari on January
16, 201519 to determine "[w]hether, to convict a defendant of distribution of a
controlled substance analogue, the government must prove that the defendant
knew that the substance constituted a controlled substance analogue, as held by
the Second, Seventh, and Eight Circuits, but rejected by the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits." 20

This Article argues that the Fourth Circuit incorrectly applied the Controlled
Substances Enforcement Act of 1986 (AEA) because its analysis fails to
recognize the scienter required by the AEA. Part II of this Article provides a
brief history of the AEA and explains the mechanics of its application. Part III
examines the different approaches taken by the federal circuits in applying the
AEA. Part IV examines how the Fourth Circuit's ruling in McFadden (1)
incorrectly reads a scienter requirement out of the statute by ignoring 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a), (2) ignores the legislative history which specifically discusses this
scienter requirement, and (3) improperly creates a strict liability crime.
II.

THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ANALOGUE ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1986

The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) was enacted in 1970 in part to combat
the "clandestine production, distribution, and use" of hallucinogenic drugs that

15. McFadden H, 753 F.3d at 435-36.
16. Id. at 436.
17. Petition for Cert., supra note 2, at 1.
18. McFadden HI, 753 F.3d at 444 (quoting United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 527 (7th
Cir. 2005)).
19. United States Supreme Court, Order List: 574 U.S. (Jan. 16, 2015), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/011615zr_f2q3.pdf.
20. Petition for Cert., supra note 2, at i.
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"first appeared in the late 1960' S."21 The CSA criminalizes "knowingly or
intentionally" manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing "a controlled
,,22
susacsae23
substance.
Controlled substances are listed in five schedules, which may be
24
amended through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Attempts to circumvent
the numerous drugs listed in the CSA schedules created a "designer drug"
25
These
phenomenon that has continued from the late 1960s to present day.
designer drugs or "analogs" (sic) are "chemical variants of controlled
substances[, which] are not subject to the provisions of the Controlled
Substances Act unless or until they are controlled in one of the five schedules of
the CSA."26 Therefore, to prevent prosecution, "clandestine chemists" can make
slight alterations to the scheduled controlled substances, which produce
substances that are not on the schedules but still have "the effects of controlled
narcotics, stimulants, depressants or hallucinogens."2 7
To combat the inability to prosecute individuals for production of these
analogues, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement
Act of 1986 by amending the CSA to include a definition of a "controlled
substance analogue," 28 and providing a mechanism for treatment of controlled
substance analogues.29
A controlled substance analogue, subject to four
exceptions30 not relevant to the present discussion, is defined as a substance:

21. Controlled Substance Analogs Enforcement Act of 1985: Hearingon S. 1437 Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 44-45 (1985) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of John C.
Lawn, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration).
22. 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) (2012).
23. Id. §§802(6), 812(a) (2012).
24. See id. § 811 (2012).
25. Hearing, supra note 21. "[T]he term designer drugs refers to clandestinely produced
substances which are chemically and pharmacologically similar to substances listed in the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) but which are not themselves controlled." Id.
26. Id. at 44.
27. Id.
28. 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A) (i)-(iii).
29. Id. § 813 (2012).
30. See id. § 802(32)(C) (i)-(iv).
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i.

the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the
chemical structure of a controlled substance in schedule I or II;

ii.

which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on
the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or
greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect
on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in
schedule I or II; or

iii.

with respect to a particular person, which such person
represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is
substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant,
or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a
controlled substance in schedule I or II.31

Although the logical connector "or" only separates subsections (ii) and (iii),
"'the vast majority of federal courts' construe it to require the government to
satisfy subsection (i) and either subsection (ii) or (iii)." 32 In McFadden, at the

district court level, a conjunctive or disjunctive reading was not at issue because
both parties agreed to a conjunctive reading, which the court "assumed" was the
correct reading.33 Once a substance has been determined to satisfy the above
definition of a controlled substance analogue, the mechanism provision of the
AEA is invoked, which states that an analogue "shall, to the extent intended for
human consumption, be treated, for the purposes of any Federal law as a
controlled substance in schedule I." 34 As federal law makes it "unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute ... or possess
with intent [to do the same] .

.

. a controlled substance," 35 and an analogue is

treated as a controlled substance, as will be discussed in more detail in Part
IV(A) of this Article, it logically follows that a controlled substance analogue
violation should require the same scienter as a controlled substance violation.

31. Id. § 802(32)(A) (i)-(iii).
32. Petition for Cert., supra note 2, at 6 n.1; see also Hearing, supra note 21, at 26, 31, 35
(statement of Assistant Att'y Gen. Stephen S. Trott). But see id. at 2 (statement of Chairman Strom
Thurmond) (stating in a Senate hearing held prior to the enactment of the AEA, that a contrary
reading of the statute requires that an analogue substance need only be "'substantially similar' either
in chemical structure or in its intended effect" (emphasis added)).
33. United States v. McFadden (McFadden 1), 15 F. Supp. 3d 668, 672 n.2 (W.D. Va. 2013).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 813.
35. Id. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
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III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES

The federal circuit courts are split 3-2 over the application of the AEA. The
Fourth and Fifth Circuits hold that in order to meet the burden of proof required
by a violation of the AEA, the government must prove: (1) the substance at issue
satisfies the definition of a controlled substance analogue, and (2) "the defendant
intended that the substance at issue be consumed by humans."36 In contrast, the
Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits hold that in addition to the above two
elements, the government must prove that the defendant "knew he was in
possession of a controlled substance analogue." 37
A.

U.S. v McFadden and the Minority Approach

The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have applied a narrow reading of the scienter
requirement when prosecuting cases involving controlled substance analogues.
The Fifth Circuit was the first to address this issue in 1989 in United States v.
Desurra.38 In Desurra, the defendant argued that in order for the government to
convict him, it would have to prove that he "understood MDMA [the alleged
analogue] to be a chemical analogue of MDA [a scheduled controlled
substance]." 39 The court rejected this argument as misunderstanding "the intent
requisite to convictions under 21 U.S.C. §§ 813, 841, 952, and 960" and held
"[ilf a defendant possesses an analogue, with intent to distribute or import, the
defendant need not know that the drug he possesses is an analogue. It suffices
that [the defendant] know what drug he possesses, and that he possess it with the
statutorily defined bad purpose."40
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Klecker, narrowly construed
the scienter requirement when addressing whether the definition of an analogue

36. United States v. McFadden (McFadden II), 753 F.3d 432, 444 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing
United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Desurra, 865
F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying the same burden of proof requirements for the government
by a violation of the AEA).
37. United States v. Sullivan, 714 F.3d 1104, 1107 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that the jury must
find that the defendant "knew he was in possession of a controlled substance analogue"); see also
United States v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 123 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that prosecution must prove
defendants acted "with the knowledge that they were in possession of a controlled substance");
United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 527 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that "defendant must know
that the substance at issue meets the definition of a controlled substance analogue set forth in
§ 802(32)(A)").
38. 865 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1989).
39. Id. at 653.
40. Id.; see also United States v. Petree, 581 F. App'x 448, 449 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 1011 (2015), reh'g denied, No. 14-7438, 2015 WL 732319 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2015)
(rejecting claim that district court committed reversible plain error by failing to find that the
defendant "knew the substances were controlled substance analogues" because, under Desurra, if "a
defendant possesses an analogue, with intent to distribute ...defendant need not know that the
drug . . is an analogue") (quoting Desurra, 865 F.2d at 653).
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was unconstitutionally vague as applied. 4' Outlining what the Government must
prove to show an AEA violation, the Klecker court included "intent that the
substance be consumed by humans" as a necessary element.42 The court found
that the definitional section of the AEA 43 was not unconstitutionally vague in
part to the intent requirement found in § 813.44 Interestingly, the court noted in
its decision that "the district court heard testimony that [the defendant] was
actually aware that Foxy was a controlled substance analogue," and that "[s]ome
courts have concluded that a defendant who had actual notice that his conduct
was unlawful cannot prevail on a vagueness challenge." 45 Additionally, the
court declined to decide whether a defendant's actual awareness that the
substance at issue was an analogue would, in and of itself, defeat a vagueness
challenge "because we conclude that the Analogue Act would not be
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Foxy even with respect to a defendant
who lacked actual notice."46
The Fourth Circuit again narrowly construed the scienter requirement in
United States v. McFadden when ruling that a proposed jury charge requiring the
government to prove the defendant knew (or strongly suspected or deliberately
avoiding knowing) that the substances at issue were analogues was incorrect. 47
The McFadden court provided no independent analysis, stating the issue had
been resolved by Klecker, which "set forth the elements that the government was
required to prove to obtain a conviction under the Act, including the scienter
requirement that the defendant intended that the substance at issue be consumed
by humans." 4 8 The McFadden court additionally noted that the Klecker decision
states "that the Act may be applied to a defendant who lacks actual notice that
the substance at issue could be a controlled substance analogue."49 As such, the
Fourth Circuit has made clear that the government need not prove the defendant
had knowledge that the substance at issue was an analogue.
However, similar to the Fifth Circuit, despite this contention, the court
provided no rationale underlying its decision nor did the court distinguish the
scienter requirement from its holdings in cases involving controlled substances
versus cases involving controlled substance analogues. 50

41. Klecker, 348 F.3d at 71.
42. Id.; cf United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 436-39 (3d Cir. 2003) (interpreting
§ 802(32)(A)).
43. The definitional section of the Analogue Act requires that the chemical structure of the
substance be substantially similar to that of a controlled substance and that the physiological effects
also be substantially similar to, or greater than, that of a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C.
§ 802(32)(A) (2012).
44. Klecker, 348 F.3d at 71.
45. Id. at 72.
46. Id. Also note that the court makes no mention of § 841. Id.
47. United States v. McFadden (McFadden II), 753 F.3d 432, 443-44 (4th Cir. 2014).
48. Id. at 444 (citing Klecker, 348 F.3d at 71).
49. Id. (citing Klecker, 348 F.3d at 72).
50. Id.
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Despite this, one court has attempted to outline the rationale underlying this
minority approach. 5 ' Essentially, the problem arises in that the "government
cannot be required to prove a defendant's knowledge that a substance is a
controlled substance when, by definition, it is not a controlled substance-it is a
controlled substance analogue." 52 The fact that "Congress directs courts to treat
these substances as schedule I controlled substances does not mean that they are
controlled substances." 53 "In fact, the definition of 'controlled substance
analogue' expressly states that the 'term does not include a controlled
substance. "'54 As a result, the question becomes how, in an AEA violation, may
the court require the government to prove the defendant knew "he was in
possession of or distributed controlled substances when the substances charged
are not, by their very nature, controlled substances?" 55 The court contends that
such a requirement "simply makes no sense in the context of the Analogue
Act."56 Rather, it is the requirement that the government prove intent for human
consumption that distinguishes analogue cases from distribution cases under the
CSA, which has no such requirement.
B.

The Majority Approach

The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have applied the scienter
requirement found in 21 U.S.C. § 841 to prosecutions involving analogues by
requiring that the government prove the defendant knew the substance in
question to be a controlled substance analogue, "and thus, by definition, a
controlled substance."
Significantly, courts have recognized that a scienter
requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the
adequacy of notice that such conduct is prohibited. 59 This same concern is

51. See United States v. Dau, No. 7:13-CR-00082, 2014 WL 4187327, at *5 (W.D. Va. Aug.
22, 2014).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(C)(i) (2012)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at *6.
57. Corrected Brief of the Appellee at 61, United States v. McFadden, 753 F.3d 432 (4th Cir.
2014) (No. 13-4349), 2013 WL 5538614, at *61.
58. Petition for Cert., supra note 2, at 14.
59. See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499
(1982) (utilizing a scienter requirement to determine the clarity of an ordinance); see also Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979) ("This Court has long recognized that the constitutionality of
a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of
mens rea."); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952) ("The statute
punishes only those who knowingly violate the Regulation."); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
101 (1945) (5-4 decision) ("The Court, indeed, has recognized that the requirement of a specific
intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise
render a vague or indefinite statute invalid."); A.G.A., Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 87 n.98 (1960) (discussing scienter and mens rea as they
relate to the void-for-vagueness doctrine at the Supreme Court level).
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addressed in the legislative history of the statute and is discussed in more detail
60
in Part IV(B) of this Article.
The Second Circuit outlined the necessary elements to obtain a criminal
conviction.61 The government must prove the substance meets the definition of
an analogue; thatthe defendant intended it for human consumption; that the
defendant intended to distribute the substance; and finally, that the defendant did
so with the knowledge he possessed a controlled substance. 62 The last element
requires the government prove the defendant knew that he possessed a controlled
substance, not merely that the defendant knew he "might be involved in some
sort of criminal activity." However, the defendants are not required to know the
63
specific drug, only that it is a controlled substance.
Of the circuits, the Seventh Circuit provides the most detailed rationale
underlying the application of the scienter requirement under § 841 to analogue
64
drugs.
In United States v. Turcotte, the court held the government must prove
a defendant's knowledge that a substance in question meets the definition of a
controlled substance analogue set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A)-specifically,
"[a] defendant must know that the substance at issue has a chemical structure
substantially similar to that of a controlled substance, and he or she must either
know that it has similar physiological effects or intend or represent that it has
such effects."65
The Turcotte court explained that the AEA "imposes criminal liability
through the more general provisions of the CSA,66 ... which implicate a wellestablished scienter requirement." 67 The court noted previous holdings "that as a
prerequisite to liability for possessing a controlled substance with intent to
distribute under § 841(a), defendants must know that the substance in question is
a controlled substance .68
Acknowledging precedent involving application
69
where the substances involved are per se illegal, the Turcotte court held, as
applied to analogues, "many newly engineered and relatively unknown
substances may be involved such that knowledge of the substance's identity does
not automatically imply knowledge of its status as a controlled substance. 70

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See infra Part IV.B; S. REP. No. 99-196, at 4 (1985).
See United States v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 123 n.1.
Id. (quoting United States v. Morales, 577 F.2d 769, 773 (2d Cir. 1978)).
See United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 527 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012).
Turcotte, 405 F.3d at 525.
Id. (citing United States v. Barlow, 310 F.3d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Section 841(a)

requires only that the defendant know that he possesses a controlled substance; it does not require
that he know the type of controlled substance he possesses."); United States v. Jones, 248 F.3d 671,

675 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Lanier for the same rule); Lanier v. United States, 220 F.3d 833, 840
(7th Cir. 2000) (requiring "knowledge that [the drug] is a controlled substance")).

69.

Turcotte, 405 F.3d at 525 (citing Barlow, 310 F.3d at 1008 (involving cocaine base);

Jones, 248 F.3d at 673 (involving crack cocaine); Lanier, 220 F.3d at 835 (involving marijuana)).

70.

Id. at 526.
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Further, "new 'designer drugs' are often created as alternatives to known illegal
drugs precisely because they may be sold with an appearance of legality."7 ' This
poses an insurmountable challenge to updating controlled substance schedules in
the face of "accelerating innovations in drug technology," which led Congress to
enact the "Analogue Provision [AEA] to target distribution of such
substances. ,,72 As such, the scienter requirement is "not obvious in the context
of the Analogue Provision." 73
The Turcotte court also acknowledged that "[a]t least one court has ruled
that 'the definition of controlled substance analogue does not require any
scienter-a defendant does not have to "know" that a substance has a
substantially similar chemical structure to an illegal drug"' 74 and that "[o]ther
courts have applied the more general scienter requirement of the CSA, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a), holding that the Analogue Provision "'requires the Government to
show that the defendants knew that they possessed a controlled substance."' 7 5
The court stated that, under this construction, defendants "need not know the
exact nature of the drug; it is sufficient that they be aware that they possessed
'some controlled substance"' 76 and found neither approach to be satisfactory.
Rather, the court held its
precedents demand a showing that the defendant knew the substance in
question was a [CSA]. That is, the defendant must know the substance
at issue meets the definition of a [CSA] set forth in § 802(32)(A): A
defendant must know that the substance at issue has a chemical structure
substantially similar to that of a controlled substance, and he or she must
either know that it has similar physiological effects or intend or
represent that it has such effects.
Acknowledging such a requirement may impose a heavy burden on the
78
government the court provided a provisional remedy.
In such cases, if the
government meets the scienter requirement by virtue of the second part of the
analogue definition, 79 "the jury is permitted-but not required-to infer that the
defendant also had knowledge of the relevant chemical similarities.so

7 1. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting United States v. Forbes, 806 F. Supp. 232, 238 (D. Col. 1992)); see also
United States v. Carlson, 87 F.3d 440, 443 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Forbes, 806 F. Supp. at 23738) (noting "the absence of a scienter requirement in the Analogue Act").

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. (quoting United Statesv. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 123 n.1 (2dCir. 2004).
Id.(quoting Roberts, 363 F.3d at 123 n.1).
Id. at 527.
Id.

79.

Id. This second part of the definition includes knowledge of or representation of similar

psychological effects. 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A)(iii).
80. Id.
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The Eighth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit's broader interpretation as
requiring more than the intent for human consumption. In United States v.
Sullivan, the court held a jury could reasonably find that the defendant must have
known that the substance at issue was a controlled substance analogue and that
the defendant knew he was in possession of a controlled substance analogue.si
In that case, at issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to provide a
reasonable inference the defendant knew the substance he possessed was an
analogue.82 The Eighth Circuit relied solely on the defendant's statement that
the substance he possessed was illegal in finding that the defendant had the
requisite knowledge that he possessed an analogue.83
IV.

EXAMINING THE
McFADDEN

FOURTH

CIRCUIT'S APPROACH IN

UNITED

STATES

V.

The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. McFadden will face
numerous uphill battles if it is going to be upheld by the Supreme Court. Not
only does the opinion place the Fourth Circuit in the minority of jurisdictions, it
is the only circuit-other than the Fifth Circuit, which made its ruling in 1989to not require the government to prove that the defendant knew that the
substance constituted a controlled substance analogue.84 The trend in the circuit
courts has been to properly consider 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) in interpreting the
overall statutory scheme, with cases from 2004, 2005, and 2013 all requiring
proof that the defendant knew he was in possession of a controlled substance
analogue.
Regardless of being the minority rule, the opinion in McFadden contains at
least three fundamental problems that make the holding subject to reversal: the
Fourth Circuit's ruling in McFadden (A) incorrectly reads a scienter requirement
out of the statute by ignoring 21 U.S.C. § 841(a); (B) ignores the legislative
history, which specifically discusses this scienter requirement; and (C)
improperly creates a strict liability crime.
A.

A Proper Reading of the Statutory Scheme of the AEA Requires Proof
that the Defendant Knew the Substance Constituted a Controlled
Substance Analogue

A prosecution for violation of the AEA requires a four-step process. First,
the substance at issue must satisfy the definition of a controlled substance
analogue.86 Second, the substance at issue must have been "intended for human

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

United States v. Sullivan, 714 F.3d 1104, 1107 (8th Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id.
United States v. Desurra, 865 F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1989).
See discussion supra Part III.B.
See 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A) (2012).
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Third, having satisfied steps one and two, the substance at issue
consumption."
"shall ... be treated, for the purposes of any Federal law as a controlled
substance in schedule I."88 Fourth, federal law makes it "unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture or distribute ... or possess
with intent [to do the same] . . . a controlled substance." 89

The Fourth Circuit in McFadden crucially does not apply the fourth step, at
least in any meaningful manner. The McFadden court's statement of the law
begins with steps two and three (above) acknowledging "that a 'controlled
substance analogue,' when intended for human consumption, [is] treated under
federal law as a Schedule I controlled substance," 90 and then proceeds to step
one, defining a controlled substance analogue. The McFadden court explains
that prosecution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (step four above) for a controlled
substance analogue requires the government to prove three elements. 91 The first
two elements address the different ways the definition of "controlled substance
92
The third element addresses that a
analogue" may be satisfied (step 1 above).
controlled substance analogue be intended for human consumption (step 2
above).93
Notwithstanding that, the Fourth Circuit acknowledges, at least summarily,
that a controlled substance analogue is prosecuted as a controlled substance
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).94 It expressly states that applying § 841(a)'s scienter
requirement to a control substance analogue case "is not a correct statement of
the law in this Circuit." 95 The McFadden court cites its own precedent for the

proposition that the scienter requirement for a controlled substance analogue
violation is that "the defendant intended that the substance at issue be consumed
by humans." 96 The court goes on to acknowledge that the Seventh Circuit, in
United States v. Turcotte, imposes "a strict knowledge requirement," but
concludes, "we have not imposed such a knowledge requirement." 97

87. Id. § 813 (2012).
88. Id.
89. Id. §841(a) (2012).
90. United States v. McFadden (McFadden II), 753 F.3d 432, 436 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing 21
U.S.C. § 813).
91. Id.
92. Id. (providing both the chemical structure prong and chemical effect prong that define a
controlled substance analogue per 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A)).
93. Id.
94. See id. at 443-44 (analyzing the controlled substance analogue in terms of § 841(a)).
95. Id. (rejecting McFadden's proposed jury instruction that the government must prove
McFadden knew "the alleged CSAs possessed the characteristics of controlled substance
analogues").
96. Id. at 444 (citing United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir. 2003)).
97. Id. (acknowledging that the Seventh Circuit's Tureotte decision "demand[s] a showing
that the defendant knew the substance in question was a controlled substance analogue."); see also
United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 527 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing the knowledge
requirement).
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In contrast, the Seventh Circuit properly applies all four steps required in a
prosecution for violation of the AEA. The Turcotte court explains that the
"analogue provisions" (steps 1-3 above) of the Controlled Substances Act98
"provide[] that substances satisfying the definition of a 'controlled substance
analogue' may be regulated as controlled substances even though they are not
formally classified as such under federal law." 99 The court acknowledged that a
controlled substance analogue is by definition not a controlled substance and
therefore a "[d]irect and literal application of the scienter requirement applicable
to § 841(a) [step 4 above, which textually only addresses controlled
substances] .

.

. would threaten to eviscerate the Analogue Provisions of §

802(32)(A) at one stroke."' 00
Notwithstanding this seeming contradiction, the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that "[d]iscarding the scienter requirement [of § 841(a)] would essentially mean
that individuals deal in narcotics substitutes at their own risk, removing a
primary mens rea element of possession and distribution offenses,"'o and
therefore held that prosecution under the AEA requires the government to prove
"the defendant knew that the substance in question was a controlled substance
analogue" 102-that is, requiring the government to proceed with step four.
The government's brief to the United States Supreme Court in opposition to
granting certiorari in McFadden v. United States argues against the Seventh
Circuit's application of the law specifically on the very issue the Seventh Circuit
acknowledges, i.e., that because by definition a controlled substance analogue is
not a controlled substance, then the mens rea of "knowingly or intentionally" in
21 U.S.C. §841(a) (step 4) should not apply to the alleged controlled substance
analogue at issue.103 However, the government's argument is a semantic
paradox.104 The government argues that the "knowing or intentional" mens rea
should only be applied to an act a defendant took e.g., the defendant must
distribute the substance "knowingly or intentionally"1 0 5 -as
opposed to a

98. The Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act is a combination of several
sections that amend the Controlled Substances Act. See Controlled Substance Analogue
Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1203, 100 Stat. 3207, 3213-14 (codified in
scattered sections of title 21 of the United States Code).
99. Turcotte, 405 F.3d at 519-20.
100. Id. at 526-27; see 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(C) (2012) (outlining that the term "controlled
substance analogue" does not include a controlled substance).
101. Id. at 527.
102. Id.
103. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 12-13, United States v. McFadden
(McFadden II), 753 F.3d 432, 437 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-378), 2014 WL 7473760 [hereinafter
Opposition Brief] (quoting Tureotte, 405 F.3d at 526).
104. SIMON BLACKBURN, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 332 (2d ed. 2008)
("[S]emantic paradoxes . . seem to depend upon an element of self-reference, in which a sentence
talks about itself, or in which a phrase refers to something defined by a set of phrases of which it is
itself one.").
105. Opposition Brief, supra note 103, at 10 (emphasis added) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(2012)).
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defendant's mental state as applied to the substance. To buttress its argument,
the government points out that "the definition of [a controlled substance]
analogue does not require that the defendant knew the chemical nature of what
he was selling,"'1 06 and0 7that the AEA requires the substance be "intended . .. for
human consumption."',

The government's arguments fail to provide support. First, the definition 1of8
a controlled substance similarly "does not contain a mens rea element either,', o
simply because it is a definition and not a mechanism for enforcement; as such, a
defendant cannot be convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) because it merely
defines "controlled substance."'1 09 Second, the government's reading of 21
U.S.C. §841(a) would make it a general intent crime when applied to a
controlled substance analogue and a specific intent crime when applied to a
controlled substance because "in an ordinary drug prosecution, [the government]
must prove that the defendant knew that the substance he sold was a controlled
substance,"' 10 not merely that he distributed some substance.
As the Southern District of Alabama concisely points out:
The government appears to be unclear about this relationship between
the statutes. It speaks of an "Analogue Act violation," demonstrated by
reference to Sections 813 and 802(32)(A) only,

. .

. but a defendant

cannot be convicted of "violating" those provisions. Section 813 is
simply a gateway provision, permitting prosecutions for violations of
controlled substance statutes of those dealing with CSAs, and Section
802(32)(A) simply defines what constitutes a CSA. Satisfying those
two statutes does not establish a "violation" of anything; it merely opens
the door to establishing a violation of other statutes."'
The district court, in United States v. Gross, went further pointing out that
the McFadden court's use of Klecker was improper because "Klecker did not
address, much less resolve, whether the government must prove the defendant's
knowledge that the substance at issue was a CSA in order to obtain a

106. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6, United States v. McFadden (McFadden II), 753 F.3d 432,
437 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-378), 2014 WL 7242820 [hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner] (citing
Opposition Brief, supra note 103, at 10-12).
107. Opposition Brief, supra note 103, at 13.
108. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 106, at 7; see 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (2012).
109. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). "The term 'controlled substance' means a drug or other
substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this
subchapter. The term does not include distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco, as those
terms are defined or used in subtitle E of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986." Id.
110. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 106, at 7 (emphasis added) (citing Opposition
Brief, supra note 103, at 12).
111. United States v. Gross, No. 13-0268-WS, 2014 WL 6483307, at *3 n.9 (S.D. Ala. Nov.
20, 2014). For the court's order on "the government's motion for pretrial ruling on scienter
requirement," see id. at * 1.
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conviction."112 The Gross court asserts that the issue in Klecker was that a
defendant's knowledge is unnecessary to defeat a vagueness challenge regarding
the definition of a controlled substance analogue.113
Gross expressly states that Klecker "is not, and cannot be, a ruling that
knowledge is unnecessary to obtain a conviction under Section 846."114
Therefore, upon satisfying the definitional sections of either a controlled
substance or a controlled substance analogue, the government must have an
enforcement mechanism and that mechanism is found in "Subchapter I. Control
and Enforcement," "Part D. Offenses and Penalties," specifically the section
"Prohibited acts A" of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)." 5
B.

The Legislative History of CSA Requires Proofof Intent or Knowledge

In its report to the United States Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary
addressed concerns about punishing legitimate or unintended actions.116 It stated
that "[s]everal specific intent elements are built into the offenses to ensure that"
innocent offenders would not be punished." 7 The very first specific intent
element discussed is the intent element being ignored by the Fourth Circuit in
McFadden.118

The Committee explained that "[f]irst, to be found guilty, an offender's
manufacture, distribution, or possession of an illicit substance must have been
knowing or intentional."1 9 It goes on to clarify: "[T]hat is, the offender must
have known or intended that he was manufacturing, distributing, or possessing a
substance that he knew or intended to have the characteristics of a controlled
20

substance analog."1

The Report goes on to list other intent elements that must be proven,
including the "intent to distribute a controlled substance analog" and that "the
substance must have been intended for human consumption."121
But, most notably, the Report lists the scienter requirement that is
specifically rejected by the Fourth Circuit as the first specific intent element built
into the statute.122 Simply put, the legislative history shows that Congress
intended that the government prove the defendant knew that the substance
constituted a controlled substance analogue.

112.
113.
114.
115.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012).
S. REP. No. 99-196, at 4 (1985).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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The Fourth CircuitRuling Improperly Creates a Strict Liability Crime

The statutory scheme enacted by Congress states a controlled substance
analogue is to "be treated . . . as a controlled substance," and it is to be so treated

"for the purpose of any Federal law."1 23
To be "treated . . as a controlled substance" means to be treated
the same as a controlled substance, and "any Federal law"
includes Sections 841(a), 846, 952(a) and 963; thus, the courts
must impose on a [controlled substance analogue] prosecution
under those statutes every requirement that applies to a
controlled substance prosecution under those statutes.124
On its face, § 813 permits no exception to the express requirement to treat
controlled substance analogues as controlled substances and therefore, given the
statutory language, eliminating the knowledge requirement is not an option.125
Doing away with the scienter requirement altogether could "ensnare
individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct."1 26 "Discarding the scienter
requirement would essentially mean that individuals deal in narcotics substitutes
at their own risk, removing a primary mens rea element of possession and
distribution offenses." 27 Such a holding directly contravenes an established
staple of federal controlled substance jurisprudencel28 and would impose strict
liability by eviscerating the necessary scienter. "It is a fundamental principle of
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that guilt is ... not lightly to be imputed to a citizen
who ... has no evil intention or consciousness of wrongdoing."1 29
In Staples v. United States, the Supreme Court explained that "we have
taken [particular care] to avoid construing a statute to dispense with mens
rea where doing so would 'criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent
conduct.""1 30 The concern is that the statute would, in essence, hold a criminal
defendant strictly liable for his conduct, which would go against centuries of
moral philosophy and criminal law. Aristotle believed that a person is not
morally responsible for his actions unless he acts voluntarily, and that "[b]y the
voluntary I mean ... any of the things in a man's own power which he does with

123. 21 U.S.C. § 813 (2012).
124. United States v. Gross, No. 13-0268-WS, 2014 WL 6483307, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 20,
2014).
125. Id.
126. United States v. Turcotte, 286 F. Supp. 2d 947, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2003), affd, 405 F.3d 515
(7th Cir. 2005).
127. Turcotte, 405 F.3d at 526.
128. Gross, 2014 WL 6483307, at *5.
129. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 286 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
130. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994) (quoting Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)).
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knowledge, i.e., not in ignorance."'131 The Supreme Court, in Staples, cites to
criminal law books and cases, dating back to the 1800s, to explain that
"[g]enerally speaking, such knowledge is necessary to establish mens rea, as is
reflected in the maxim ignorantiafactiexcusat."132
At issue in Staples was whether the defendant knew he possessed a machine
gun even though the statute did not contain an express scienter element.1 33 The
Supreme Court held that a successful criminal prosecution required that the
defendant "knew the weapon he possessed had the characteristics that brought it
within the statutory definition."1 34 As articulated in McFadden's Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari:
[I]f the defendant knew he possessed a rifle, but did not know that it
would fire multiple rounds with a single pull of the trigger, he could not
be convicted of knowingly possessing an unregistered machine gun. He
might have knowingly possessed a rifle, which was in fact a machine
gun; but he could not knowingly possess a machine gun unless he knew
that it had the features (i.e., the capacity to fire multiple rounds with a
single trigger pull) that makes owning it potentially illegal.135
Therefore, the question remains whether "hold[ing] a criminal defendant
strictly liable for the chemical structure and effects on a substance in his
possession" is any different from "holding a defendant strictly liable for the
operation of his firearm."1 36 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit ruling ignores this
question and disregards centuries of legal tradition in which "courts ordinarily
read a phrase in a criminal statute that introduces the elements
of a crime with
37
the word 'knowingly' as applying that word to each element."'1
V.

CONCLUSION

The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the AEA risks "impos[ing] criminal
sanctions on a class of persons whose mental state-ignorance of the
characteristics of [the substances] in their possession-makes their actions
entirely innocent."'13 8 The statutory interplay of sections 802(32)(A), 813, and
841(A) requires a reading where a defendant can only be convicted if he knows
the substance he is distributing is, in fact, a controlled substance analogue. By

131. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1791

(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1st ed. 1984).
132. Staples, 511 U.S. at 607-08 n.3 (citing generally to criminal law books and cases from
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
133. Id. at 602.
134. Id.
135. Petition for Cert., supra note 2, at 21.
136. Id. at 22
137. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 652 (2009).
138. Staples, 511 U.S. at 614-15, cited in Petition for Cert., supra note 2, at 24-25.
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only referencing 802(32)(A) and 813, the Fourth Circuit only looks to gateway
provisions that would permit a prosecution for violations of the controlled
"Satisfying those two statutes does not establish a
substances statutes.
'violation' of anything; it merely opens the door to establishing a violation of
other statutes.',1 39 Further, the Fourth Circuit ignored the legislative history of
the AEA, which clearly anticipates this problem and instructs that the
prosecution must prove that the defendant knew the substance he was
manufacturing, distributing, or possessing was a controlled substance analogue.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit has written out the scienter requirement from this
element of the statute and has ignored centuries of legal tradition.

139. United States v. Gross, No. 13-0268-WS, 2014 WL 6483307, at *3 n.9 (S.D. Ala. Nov.
20, 2014).
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